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Background: An emerging body of research has begun to elucidate disturbances
to social cognition in specific personality disorders (PDs). No research has been
conducted on patients with Mixed Personality Disorder (MPD), however, who meet
multiple diagnostic criteria. Further, very few studies have compared social cognition
between patients with PD and those presenting with symptomatic diagnoses that co-
occur with personality pathologies, such as anxiety disorder (AD). The aim of this
study was to provide a detailed characterization of deficits to various aspects of social
cognition in MPD and dissociate impairments specific to MPD from those exhibited by
patients with AD who differ in the severity of personality pathology.
Method: Building on our previous research, we administered a large battery of
self-report and performance-based measures of social cognition to age-, sex- and
education-matched groups of patients with MPD or AD, and healthy control participants
(HCs; n = 29, 23, and 54, respectively). This permitted a detailed profiling of these clinical
groups according to impairments in emotion recognition and regulation, imitative control,
low-level visual perspective taking, and empathic awareness and expression.
Results: The MPD group demonstrated poorer emotion recognition for negative facial
expressions relative to both HCs and AD. Compared with HCs, both clinical groups also
performed significantly worse in visual perspective taking and interference resolution,
and reported higher personal distress when empathizing and more state-oriented
emotion regulation.
Conclusion: We interpret our results to reflect dysfunctional cognitive control that is
common to patients with both MPD and AD. Given the patterns of affective dispositions
that characterize these two diagnostic groups, we suggest that prolonged negative
affectivity is associated with inflexible styles of emotion regulation and attribution. This
might potentiate the interpersonal dysfunction exhibited in MPD, particularly in negatively
valenced and challenging social situations.
Keywords: Social cognition, personality disorder, anxiety, emotion recognition, imitative control, visual
perspective taking, empathy, emotion regulation
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INTRODUCTION
Disturbances to interpersonal functioning are recognized
increasingly as a characteristic symptom of many psychiatric
conditions, particularly personality disorders (PD; Schilbach,
2016; Cotter et al., 2018). This is reflected in the redefinition
of personality pathology in the most recent version of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5); in addition to
impairments in cognition, affectivity and impulse control,
interpersonal dysfunction is considered a primary manifestation
of personality pathologies (Hopwood et al., 2013). Such
interpersonal dysfunction will result in altered interaction
styles that impact negatively on the quality of social exchanges,
thereby reinforcing patients’ maladaptive patterns of thought
and behavior in a self-perpetuating manner (Schilbach, 2016).
This can be observed in the clinical setting; the interpersonal
difficulties characterizing PD have negative effects on patient-
clinician interactions, thereby compromising the efficacy of
therapy and increasing the risk of chronicity (Tyrer et al., 2015).
In this light it is essential to develop effective interventions
for the interpersonal dysfunction shown in PD, but this
demands a precise characterization of the impairments shown
by these patients.
The broad repertoire of cognitive and affective abilities that
support efficient social interaction and enable adaptive behavior
within social environments are referred to collectively as social
cognition. Despite a lack of agreement concerning the structure
of cognitive skills subsumed within this psychological construct,
and considerable variability among existing taxonomies (Happé
et al., 2017), several facets have been investigated in both
healthy and clinical populations: (1) Emotion recognition – our
ability to recognize emotional expressions in others; (2) imitative
control – the capacity to inhibit our automatic tendency to
imitate the actions of others; (3) visual perspective taking –
the process through which we infer what others can see; (4)
empathy – our ability to understand and share in the emotions
of others (cognitive and affective empathy, respectively), whilst
recognizing that they are the source of one’s own emotional
state (Cuff et al., 2014); and (5) emotion regulation – the
capacity to self-regulate our emotional responses in order to
behave appropriately in the face of changing environmental
demands (Aldao, 2013). These distinct facets of social cognition
are assumed to be organized in a hierarchical manner, whereby
complex abilities build on more elementary mechanisms –
efficient emotion recognition and imitative control are suggested
to be necessary for affective empathy, for example, and low-
level perspective taking is considered a prerequisite for cognitive
empathy (Decety, 2011; Happé et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2018).
Another fundamental cognitive mechanism believed to serve a
crucial role in all of the aforementioned processes is one that
allows us to distinguish and switch flexibly between self- and
other-representations. Such self-other distinction is necessary
for self-regulation during social interactions; it will allow us to
control imitative tendencies, to avoid personal distress when
empathizing by attributing the cause of our own emotional
responses to the target of our empathic expression, and to prevent
the misattribution of our own egocentric viewpoint onto others
when inferring their perspective (Decety, 2011; Lamm et al., 2016;
Steinbeis, 2016).
Research into these socio-cognitive abilities in PD have
begun to reveal impairments in many diagnostic groups. This
includes disturbances in the discrimination of emotional facial
expressions in Narcissistic (Marissen et al., 2012), Antisocial
(Zhang et al., 2016) and Borderline PD (Berenson et al., 2018);
reduced imitative control in Borderline PD (Hauschild et al.,
2018); an inability to accurately infer the mental states of
others in Narcissistic (Bilotta et al., 2018) and Avoidant PD
(Moroni et al., 2016); subtle alterations in empathic awareness
and expression in Obsessive–Compulsive (Cain et al., 2015) and
Narcissistic PD (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014); and differential
patterns of dysfunctional emotion regulation among all Cluster
A, B and C diagnoses (Borges and Naugle, 2017; for reviews
on social cognition, see Herpertz and Bertsch, 2014; Cotter
et al., 2018). Interestingly, in Borderline PD these impairments
have been attributed to dysfunctional self-other distinction
(Beeney et al., 2016). While this research has begun to provide
valuable insights into the nature of socio-cognitive disturbances
emerging in specific forms of personality pathology, the focus on
discrete diagnostic categories has meant that patients presenting
with symptoms that span multiple diagnostic criteria have
received very little attention. This is concerning given the high
prevalence of the Mixed PD category (MPD) in clinical practice
(World Health Organization, 2004; Zimmerman et al., 2005).
Moreover, it is suggested that a categorical diagnostic system is
inappropriate for PD given the vast heterogeneity exhibited by
patients; artificially discrete diagnoses ignore the comorbidities
shared among different diagnostic groups (Zimmerman et al.,
2005; Clark et al., 2015; Tyrer et al., 2015).
Given the issues associated with the categorical model of
PD, a considerable number of clinicians favor alternative hybrid
or dimensional models (Morey and Hopwood, 2019). The
dimensional approach places personality on a continuum ranging
from personality style to disorder; PD is considered to sit on
the latter pathological end of this continuum, characterized by
a limited repertoire of personality styles that are used inflexibly
in response to changing environmental demands. From this
dimensional perspective, similar but less severe profiles of socio-
cognitive disturbances should be observed in healthy individuals
who exhibit the same pattern of inflexibility among certain
personality styles as PD patients (e.g., emotional instability).
Indeed, in a previous investigation conducted on a large healthy
sample we revealed associations between individual differences
in the flexible deployment of personality styles and various
components of social cognition: Relative to individuals reporting
a broader repertoire of personality styles, those showing a
strong preference for avoidant, borderline, depressive, and
dependent styles exhibited less control over imitative tendencies,
maladaptive styles of emotion regulation, and greater distress
when empathizing with others (Shaw et al., 2018). This
suggests that personality mechanisms giving rise to maladaptive
tendencies toward specific personality traits might drive the
patterns of social cognitive dysfunction observed in PD.
The dimensional approach to PD could also elucidate other
important mechanisms behind social cognitive dysfunction; for
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example, difficulties in specific socio-cognitive abilities might be
driven by symptoms such as social withdrawal and emotional
instability that result from the altered personality emerging across
multiple PDs (Hopwood et al., 2011; Semerari et al., 2014, 2015;
Moroni et al., 2016). Importantly, many discrete PD diagnostic
groups display high comorbidity with anxiety and depression
(Friborg et al., 2013; Kret and Ploeger, 2015), particularly Cluster
C pathologies such as Avoidant, Dependent and Obsessive-
Compulsive PD (Friborg et al., 2013). Although previous research
indicates that disturbances in social cognition might differentiate
between PD and emotional (e.g., anxiety) disorders (Semerari
et al., 2014), very few studies have contrasted social cognition
among these patient groups (Pellecchia et al., 2018).
The aim of this study was to provide a detailed
characterization of disturbances to social cognition in MPD,
and to dissociate these impairments according to severity of
personality pathology. To do so, we compared performance
on a large test battery comprising various measures of social
cognition among groups of age- and sex-matched, patients with
MPD, patients with anxiety disorder (AD), and healthy control
participants (HCs). Both patient groups were characterized
by anxiety and depressive symptoms, but differed in the
severity of personality pathology; specifically, the degree of
disturbance to interpersonal functioning. This allowed us
to identify impairments to social cognition specific to MPD
or common to both psychiatric groups. Given our previous
finding that personality-related individual differences in social
cognition span multiple levels (Shaw et al., 2018), we measured
socio-cognitive abilities believed to reflect both fundamental
mechanisms as well as higher-level processes; specifically, the
test battery included measures of emotion recognition, imitative
control and visual perspective taking, with tests of higher-level
cognitive and affective empathy, and emotion regulation. Our
choice of specific measures was driven by research in both
healthy and clinical samples, such as patients with autism
spectrum disorder (Sowden et al., 2016; Deschrijver et al., 2017),
schizophrenia (Langdon et al., 2001), depression (Grunewald
et al., 2015) and multiple sclerosis (Czekóová et al., 2019).
On the basis of the previous research summarized
above, we predicted that the greater severity of personality
disturbances presented by MPD patients would manifest as
poorer discrimination among emotional facial expressions, less
control over imitative tendencies, worse perspective taking,
reduced empathic expression, and altered emotion regulation
relative to those with AD and HCs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
The sample comprised 29 patients diagnosed with MPD and 23
with anxiety disorder (AD) recruited from University Hospital,
Brno, Czechia from 2016 to 2018, and 54 healthy control
(HC) participants matched on age, sex, and education (highest
attainment). The HC sample was selected among staff and
associates of Masaryk University who reported no history
(or presence) of psychiatric or neurological disorders, periods
of emotional dysfunction, participation in psychotherapy, or
psychiatric medication. All patients were admitted at their own
request, and diagnosed independently by a psychiatrist and a
psychologist at the beginning of their treatment according to the
International Personality Disorders Examination (Loranger et al.,
1997). The MPD group comprised patients meeting diagnostic
criteria of multiple PDs, the most frequent of which were
histrionic, borderline, avoidant, and narcissistic PDs. The second
group comprised patients who met criteria for anxiety disorder
(AD), including social and generalized anxiety, somatization,
mixed anxiety-depressive, and panic disorder. Importantly,
patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder were not included
in this sample due to known differences in their socio-cognitive
disturbances compared with other anxiety diagnoses (Plana et al.,
2014). The two clinical groups did not differ with respect to
anxiety or depressive symptoms. Patients and HCs were included
only if they reported no past or present neurological disorders
(e.g., epilepsy), substance dependence, or psychotic disorders.
None of the patients were confirmed to suffer from migraine. For
details on demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample,
see Table 1.
The study was approved by the Ethics Board of the Institute
of Psychology, Academy of Sciences in the Czechia, and all
participants provided written informed consent prior taking part.
Procedure
A large battery of performance-based (implicit) and self-report
(explicit) measures of social cognition was administered to all
participants. This battery was developed in a previous study
(Shaw et al., 2018) to assess state affectivity at the time of testing,
imitative control, emotion recognition, empathic awareness and
expression, low-level visual perspective taking, and emotion
regulation. In the section below, each test comprising this battery
is described briefly in the order they were administered. The
reader is referred to our original paper for more details.
All measures comprising the test battery were programed and
presented in Cogent (v1.31)1, a toolbox for MATLAB (vR2015b;
The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, United States). Completion of
the test battery took approximately 1.5 h.
Affective State
To examine whether participants’ positive and negative affectivity
at the time of testing differed between the study groups,
which might confound other measures of social cognition,
we administered the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect
Test (Quirin et al., 2009). This measure achieves good test-
retest reliability and construct validity, and has been found
to predict physiological indices of affectivity more accurately
than explicit self-report instruments (Quirin et al., 2009;
Quirin and Bode, 2014).
This task involved six artificial stimulus words (e.g., “SAFME,”
“TUNBA”). Using a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “Does not fit
at all”, 4 = “Fits very well”), participants rated the extent to
which these words convey six different mood states (happy,
cheerful, energetic, helpless, tense or inhibited). Each artificial
1http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php
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TABLE 1 | Sample demographics and clinical characteristics.
Groups
MPD AD HCs p
Age (mean [SE]) 34.6 (2.3) 38.0 (2.3) 34.6 (1.7) 0.497
Sex (male/female frequency) 5/24 7/16 14/40 0.505
Education (median years [IQR]) 13 (11–13) 13 (11–18) 13 (13–18) 0.091
Anxiety (%) 93.1 100 – 0.497
Depressive symptoms (%) 89.7 82.6 – 0.686
Percentage of diagnostic comorbidity MPD
HIS EMU AVO NAR DEP ANA SCH PAR DIS
48.3 41.4 37.9 31.0 27.6 20.7 13.8 10.3 0.0
Percentage of diagnostic comorbidity AD
MAD GAD SOM PAD SOC
47.8 30.4 26.1 17.4 13.1
MPD, Mixed Personality Disorder; AD, Anxiety Disorder; HCs, Healthy Controls; IQR, Inter-quartile range; HIS, Histrionic; EMU, Emotionally Unstable; AVO, Avoidant; NAR,
Narcissistic; DEP, Dependent; ANA, Anankastic; SCH, Schizoid; PAR, Paranoid; DIS, Dissocial; MAD, Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder; GAD, Generalized Anxiety
Disorder; SOM, Somatoform Disorder; PAD, Panic Disorder; SOC, Social Phobia.
word was presented with one of the six mood-state adjectives
in a pseudo-random order, resulting in 36 trials. Ratings for
positive and negative mood states were averaged and used as the
dependent measures.
Emotion Recognition
To assess participants’ ability to discriminate among neutral
and emotionally evocative stimuli, the battery included an
emotional Go/No-Go task (e.g., Tottenham et al., 2011). This
task comprised 6 blocks of 40 trials, each block presenting
a pseudo-randomized sequence of face stimuli with either
emotional or neutral expression. Each trial started with a fixation
cross that was followed immediately by 500 ms presentation
of a face. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as
quickly as possible whenever the face portrayed a particular
expression (“Go” trials), and to withhold that action when a
different expression was shown (“No-go” trials). A pre-potent
tendency to respond was induced by the ratio of the two trial
types (Go = 70%, No-go = 30%). No more than two No-
go trials were presented in succession within a block. In any
given block, an emotional expression was always paired with a
neutral expression; the emotional expression was either the “Go”
stimulus (with the neutral expression as the “No-Go” stimulus)
or the “No-Go” stimulus (with the neutral expression serving as
the “Go” stimulus). The task comprised three emotional (angry,
fearful, and happy expressions) and three non-emotional blocks
(neutral expressions). A short practice block was administered for
participants to familiarize themselves with the task. The stimuli
were selected from the Radboud Faces Database (14 males;
Langner et al., 2010), gray scaled and cropped to remove any hair.
Performance was indexed by D-prime scores, calculated
separately for each individual block by subtracting the
z-transformed false alarm rate from the z-transformed hit rate for
both stimulus types. As such, higher scores on each block indicate
better discrimination between the Go and No-go emotions.
Imitative Control
Imitation was examined implicitly with a Stimulus-Response
Compatibility task (Brass et al., 2001; Cracco et al., 2018),
whereby participants execute finger-lifting actions in response
to a colored dot (imperative stimulus) while observing task-
irrelevant finger actions performed by a model’s hand (stimulus
hand). On this task, executed finger movements are found
consistently to be faster and more accurate in response to
matching (compatible) compared with opposing (incompatible)
observed movements. This is referred to as automatic imitation,
and is used as an experimental measure of imitative control.
Each trial began with the stimulus hand resting on a flat
surface, whereby participants depressed both the left and right
directional arrows on a standard keyboard with the index and
middle finger of their right hand, respectively. After a random
interval of 800–2400 ms, this warning stimulus was replaced
with an end-point image of the same stimulus hand performing
either an index or middle finger extension. This end-point image
contained a dot located between the index and middle finger, the
color of which indicated whether the participant should extend
their own index or middle finger as quickly as possible. The
inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. Two blocks of 90 trials were
administered: 30 Compatible (the same action was both signaled
and observed), 30 Incompatible (different actions were signaled
and observed), 20 Baseline (a movement was signaled but not
observed), and 10 Catch trials (no action was signaled, but a
movement was observed). Five practice trials were completed
before the task began.
Employing the same approach taken in other studies
(for reviews see Heyes, 2011; Cracco et al., 2018), the
difference in response time (RT) on Incompatible relative to
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Compatible trials was used as our measure of interest – a
greater compatibility effect was taken to index less control
over imitative tendencies. Genschow et al. (2017) reported a
high split-half reliability of 0.86 for this compatibility effect.
Importantly, each block presented the model’s hand in either
a clockwise (+90◦), or counter-clockwise rotation (−90◦) from
the participants’ perspective. This allowed us to isolate imitative
compatibility from the potentially confounding influences of
spatial-compatibility effects (for illustrations see Shaw et al.,
2017). To separate the sources of automatic imitation, we
calculated RTs in each block separately.
Visual Perspective Taking
Level-1 visual perspective taking was investigated with The
Director Task (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000), whereby participants
move objects around a grid of shelves according to verbal
instructions given by a “Director.” This task has been used
elsewhere to investigate both the developmental trajectory
(Dumontheil et al., 2010) and neurophysiological underpinnings
of visual perspective taking (for a review see Bukowski, 2018).
Further, this task achieved excellent split-half reliability in our
previous study (Shaw et al., 2018). Some of the boxes have
opaque backs, which means that the Director cannot see their
contents from her position behind the shelf display – these
are visible only from participant’s vantage point. The Director’s
instruction on experimental trials refers to an object placed
in one of the opaque boxes (e.g., “Move the smallest apple”),
creating a discrepancy between the Director and participants’
perspectives. To follow the instructions correctly, the participant
must ignore their own perspective and discount any “distractor”
objects not visible to the Director (e.g., they were to move the
medium-sized apple rather than the smallest). In three different
control conditions, no distractor object is present to create a
discrepancy: In the first it is replaced with a different object, in the
second the Director’s instructions refer to objects within boxes
without opaque backs, and in the third the Director is absent
and participants must carry out instructions according to their
own perspective.
Participants responded by indicating with the mouse into
which box the object should be moved, and RT and accuracy
was measured on each trial. To allow for comparisons with
our previous findings, as an index visual perspective-taking
ability we calculated relative measures of both RT and accuracy
by regressing averaged values across all control conditions
from those in the experimental condition (see Shaw et al.,
2017; 2018). This produced standardized residuals for each
participant, with higher values representing longer RTs and
higher accuracy on experimental relative to control trials. Since
correlational analyses between RT and accuracy showed no sign
of a speed-accuracy trade-off (p ≥ 0.126), inverted efficiency
scores were not calculated.
Empathy
Implicit measure
To measure empathy implicitly, we used a task developed
previously (Shaw et al., 2018) that follows the same principles
as the Multifaceted Empathy Test to delineate between
cognitive and affective components (Dziobek et al., 2008). The
task involved two blocks of 30 color photographs depicting
individuals in different emotional contexts. Each photograph
was presented randomly in each block for a maximum of 10 s.
Participants were required to (1) select one of four emotion
labels that best describes how the person in the image is feeling
(cognitive empathy), and to (2) rate their own arousal while
observing the image on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “None,”
7 = “Very strong”; affective empathy).
Importantly, since cognitive empathy did not achieve
acceptable reliability in our previous large-scale sample (Shaw
et al., 2018), we decided to focus only on arousal ratings as a
measure of affective empathy herein.
Explicit measure
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) was employed
as a multidimensional self-report measure of cognitive and
affective aspects of trait empathy. This instrument has been
shown to be both valid and highly reliable across European
samples (e.g., De Corte et al., 2007; Gilet et al., 2013). Cognitive
facets are represented by the subscales Perspective Taking (the
motivation/tendency to adopt the psychological perspective of
others spontaneously) and Fantasy (the tendency to transpose
oneself imaginatively into the feelings and actions of fictional
characters). Affective empathy is indexed by Empathic Concern
(the tendency to experience feelings of sympathy and concern
toward others) and Personal Distress (the tendency to experience
personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal settings).
This instrument comprises 28-items, each rated on a five-point
Likert scale (1 = “Does not describe me well,” 5 = “Describes
me very well”).
Emotion Regulation
The Action Control Scale (Kuhl and Beckmann, 1994) was
employed to assess participants’ self-reported ability to regulate
their negative and positive affective states in a flexible and
adaptive manner under different conditions. Scores indicate
the degree to which an individual has this capacity for
action-oriented emotion regulation in two domains: Failure
vs. preoccupation (AOF) and Demand vs. hesitation (AOD).
Importantly, both of these sub-scales achieved acceptable
reliability in our previous large-scale study (Shaw et al., 2018).
Each subscale provides two alternatives in response to 12
everyday situations; for instance, in response to the statement
“When several things go wrong on the same day,” participants
can choose a state-oriented (“I don’t know how to deal with it”)
or action-orientation response (“I just keep on going as though
nothing had happened”). Low scores indicate state-oriented
tendencies toward negative affect – that is, the tendency to
ruminate over past failures and limited self-access (AOF), and a
limited ability to preserve positive affect in complex and difficult
situations (AOD).
RESULTS
Since the majority of variables did not meet the assumptions
of parametric testing, performance among the groups was
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compared using non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and follow-
up Mann-Whitney tests corrected for multiple comparisons
with the false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
Table 2 presents the group medians and interquartile ranges for
measures with comparable performance, and Figure 1 illustrates
all significant differences among the groups.
The MPD, AD, and HC groups did not differ on the implicit
measure of positive (X[2] = 0.382, p = 0.826) or negative affective
state at the time of testing (X[2] = 1.503, p = 0.472).
On the Stimulus-Response Compatibility procedure, the three
groups exhibited statistically equivalent imitative control in
response to the stimuli that isolated imitative compatibility
from confounding spatial influences (X[2] = 1.391, p = 0.499).
In response to the stimulus affording confounding spatial-
compatibility effects, however, there were significant differences
among the groups (X[2] = 13.302, p = 0.001), whereby
both the MPD and AD groups expressed significantly greater
compatibility effects relative to the HC group (Z = −2.999,
pcorr. = 0.005, r = 0.33, 95% CI [−0.11, −0.55]; Z = −2.923,
pcorr. = 0.005, r = 0.34 [−0.11, −0.56]), but did not differ from
one another (pcorr. > 0.05).
On the Go/No-Go task, a comparison of D-prime scores
in each block revealed that the three groups differed only in
their ability to discriminate neutral from angry (X[2] = 15.905,
p < 0.001) and fearful (X[2] = 10.004, p = 0.007) No-go
facial expressions, and happy from neutral No-go expressions
(X[2] = 7.101, p = 0.029). Follow-up tests revealed that all these
differences reflected poorer discriminatory ability in the MPD
group relative to HCs for the angry (Z =−4.01822, pcorr. < 0.001,
r = 0.45 [−0.23, −0.68]), fearful (Z = −3.090, pcorr. = 0.006,
r = 0.35 [−0.12, −0.57]) and happy blocks (Z = −2.719,
pcorr. = 0.018, r = 0.30 [−0.08,−0.52]), and in the MPD compared
with the AD group on blocks containing angry (Z = −2.206,
pcorr. = 0.041, r = 0.31 [−0.03, −0.59]) and fearful expressions
(Z =−2.273, pcorr. = 0.033, r = 0.32 [−0.04,−0.60]).
In terms of empathy, the three groups did not differ
significantly from one another on the implicit measure of arousal
(X[2] = 4.265, p = 0.119), nor in their self-reported Perspective
Taking (X[2] = 1.926 p = 0.382), Empathic Concern (X[2] = 4.842,
p = 0.089), or Fantasy (X[2] = 3.060, p = 0.217). The groups
did differ, however, in their self-reported levels of Personal
Distress when empathizing (X[2] = 12.776, p = 0.002), with
both clinical groups scoring equivalently higher than the HCs
(MPD: Z = −3.030, pcorr. = 0.006, r = 0.33 [−0.12, −0.55]; AD:
Z =−2.735, pcorr. = 0.009, r = 0.31 [−0.09,−0.54]).
Group comparisons of perspective-taking performance on
experimental relative to control trials in the Director Task
revealed that all three groups responded correctly with equivalent
RTs (X[2] = 4.391, p = 0.111), but differed in their accuracy
(X[2] = 7.842, p = 0.020); specifically, both clinical groups
achieved poorer accuracy relative to the HCs (MPD: Z =−2.323,
pcorr. = 0.045, r = 0.26 [−0.04, −0.49]; AD: Z = −2.164,
pcorr. = 0.045, r = 0.26 [−0.02, −0.49]), but did not differ
significantly from each other (pcorr. = 0.947).
Finally, the groups differed in failure- (AOF: X[2]) = 9.629,
p = 0.008) and demand-related emotion regulation (AOD:
X[2] = 8.955, p = 0.011); while the AD group reported more
state-oriented emotion regulation following failure relative to
the HCs (Z = −2.892, pcorr. = 0.009, r = 0.35 [−0.11, −0.59]),
the MPD participants reported more demand-related state
orientation compared to HCs (Z = −2.816, pcorr. = 0.012,
r = 0.33 [−0.10,−0.56]).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to provide a detailed, multi-level
characterization of disturbances to social cognition in patients
with Mixed Personality Disorder (MPD) relative to patients
with anxiety disorder (AD), and healthy controls (HCs). To
achieve this, we administered a battery of tests measuring
both high- and low-level socio-cognitive abilities to all three
groups, which has been shown to dissociate among personality
styles differing in emotional dispositions (Shaw et al., 2018).
Our results reveal discrete patterns of dysfunctional social
information processing in both clinical groups compared with
HCs, but more severe socio-cognitive impairments in patients
with MPD. In the discussion below, we interpret each of the
principle findings.
Firstly, patients with MPD demonstrated poorer
discrimination of certain emotional facial expressions relative
to the HC; this was true for both angry and fearful faces
presented within a neutral context, and neutral faces within
a prevailing context of happy expressions. This finding both
supports and extends previous research into PD: Poorer accuracy
in the classification and identification of fearful faces has been
TABLE 2 | Descriptives of non-differentiating variables.
Variable MPD AD HCs
Affect Positive 2.06 (1.78− 2.50) 2.17 (1.83− 2.53) 2.19 (1.72− 2.44)
Negative 2.28 (1.81− 2.39) 2.22 (1.90− 2.60) 2.06 (1.88− 2.44)
Imitation −2.44 (− 32.48− 23.28) −9.82 (− 23.07− 12.26) 3.23 (− 15.94− 21.49)
Emotion recognition A-N 0.06 (− 1.16− 0.95) 0.57 (− 0.64− 1.23) 0.51 (− 0.40− 0.96)
F-N −0.20 (− 1.25− 0.71) 0.32 (− 0.73− 1.01) 0.62 (− 0.22− 1.31)
N-H 0.29 (− 0.43− 0.82) 0.65 (− 0.45− 1.00) 0.47 (− 0.39− 1.18)
Values present medians (and interquartile ranges). MPD, Mixed Personality Disorder; AD, Anxiety Disorder; HCs, Healthy Controls; Imitation, imitative control in response
to the stimulus isolating imitative from spatial compatibility (see text); Emotion recognition, D-prime scores (z-transformed) on angry Go/neutral No-go (A-N); fearful
Go/neutral No-go (F-N); and neutral Go/happy No-go blocks.
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FIGURE 1 | Comparisons of Socio-cognitive Aspects among Patient Groups and Healthy Controls. For comparisons with other studies, plots present means and
standard errors for the MPD (red), AD (blue) and HC groups (green). ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
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reported in patients with Avoidant, Narcissistic, and Borderline
PD (Rosenthal et al., 2011; Marissen et al., 2012; Semerari
et al., 2014), and a lower sensitivity to anger and happiness
has been observed in non-clinical individuals with avoidance
problems (Vrijen et al., 2016). In MPD, this impairment in
emotion processing appears to go beyond the general response
bias toward negatively valenced emotions reported elsewhere
(Mitchell et al., 2014; Semerari et al., 2014). More importantly,
the poorer performance of these patients on blocks in which
pre-potent responses were to be withheld for negative facial
expressions appears to be related to the severity of personality
pathology; the MPD group performed worse on these blocks
than patients with AD.
Given the other results of this study discussed below, this
seemingly specific impairment reveals important differences
between the MPD and AD groups. The GNG task requires
participants to perform a number of cognitive operations
at speed – they must identify the emotion expressed by a
given face, recall whether or not a response is required,
and, on No-go trials, inhibit an inappropriate action. This
places huge demands upon cognitive control processes –
namely, the monitoring and updating of working memory
representations, switching flexibly between multiple tasks,
and the intentional overriding of a dominant or pre-potent
response (see Miyake et al., 2000; Diamond, 2013). Poorer
performance on this measure of social cognition in the
MPD relative to AD group may therefore indicate that the
former patients experience greater dysfunction in cognitive
control under speeded discrimination among negative and
neutral facial expressions. In the same way that this impedes
performance on a socio-cognitive task, such dysfunction would
hamper social exchanges and serve to exacerbate symptoms
of dysfunctional social interaction, especially when it involves
negative emotions.
At first glance, both the MPD and AD patient groups
appear to exhibit significantly poorer control over imitative
tendencies compared with HCs – they were slower at executing
actions while they observed incompatible compared with
compatible actions performed by another individual, which
is taken as an experimental index of mimicry (Heyes, 2011).
Importantly, however, differences between the clinical and HC
groups were restricted to action stimuli that we have shown
previously to confound imitative- with spatial-compatibility
effects (Shaw et al., 2017). For this reason, we question
the degree to which responses to these stimuli reflect true
mimicry. Since behavior was comparable across clinical and HC
groups in response to action stimuli for which this confound
was removed, we suggest that MPD and AD patients were
expressing difficulties in interference resolution (a cognitive
control process through which relevant information is selected
and irrelevant information suppressed) rather than imitative
control per se. To our knowledge, the only study that has
investigated imitative tendencies in PD also employed spatially
confounded stimuli (Hauschild et al., 2018). As such, the
elevated compatibility effect shown by patients with Borderline
PD in this former study might also index dysfunctional
cognitive control.
Both clinical groups achieved poorer accuracy in visual
perspective taking relative to HCs. We are unaware of any
previous investigations into this low-level socio-cognitive
ability in either PD or AD, and so this finding has two
important implications. Firstly, the capacity of this simple
experimental task to differentiate between the MPD, AD, and
non-clinical groups presents an important novel contribution
to the literature on social cognition in PD. Poorer perspective-
taking performance may provide an important index of
dysfunction to a fundamental cognitive domain in this
psychiatric population; patients with Avoidant PD demonstrate
difficulties in suppressing their own perspective in order to
adopt that of another (“decentration”; Dimaggio et al., 2009;
Moroni et al., 2016), and those with Borderline PD express
problems in distinguishing between internal psychological
content and objective reality (“differentiation”; Semerari
et al., 2014, 2015). In this light, perspective taking in PD
might reveal dissociable patterns of impairment to self-
other distinction (SOD); when faced with conflicting self-
and other-representations, patients with MPD appear to
default to an egocentric self-bias while the hyper-mentalizing
observed in Borderline PD suggests the reverse altercentric
bias (Semerari et al., 2014). Such alterations to SOD may
be another manifestation of dysfunctional cognitive control;
namely, an inability to switch flexibly between cognitive self- and
other-representations.
Second, similarly poorer perspective-taking ability in the AD
group might indicate the role of altered emotionality in this
socio-cognitive impairment in MPD. This finding converges with
previous research into disorders characterized by heightened
negative emotionality; anxious individuals tend to rely on
their own (egocentric) perspective when they attempt to infer
what others can see and know (Todd et al., 2015). This
may be related to the altered attributional styles expressed by
AD patients, who demonstrate negative and depressive biases
when interpreting ambiguous events (see Plana et al., 2014).
In a similar vein, non-clinical dysphoric individuals exhibit
difficulties in taking others’ viewpoints relative to participants
without elevated depressive symptomatology (Nilsen and Duong,
2013). Further, major depression has been associated with a
negative interpretative bias when processing facial expressions
(heightened sensitivity toward sad relative to happy facial
expressions; Weightman et al., 2014 [but see Ferguson and
Cane, 2017]). Perhaps, then, anxiety and depressive symptoms
included in the clinical characterization of MPD might exert an
adverse influence on SOD. Further research is needed to elucidate
the potential contribution of these comorbidities in dysfunction
to cognitive control in PD. Future studies should consider
employing additional (independent) measures of anxiety and
depression, which might provide insights into their potentially
moderating influence.
We observed comparable expressions of affective empathy
among all clinical and non-clinical groups in both the
self-report and performance-based measures. Although this
may be surprising at first glance, inconsistencies in the
existing literature suggest that any impairments to empathic
expression are subtle, complex, and highly variable; while
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 563
fpsyg-11-00563 March 26, 2020 Time: 11:43 # 9
Czekóová et al. Social Cognition in Personality Disorder
some studies report disturbances to affective but preserved
cognitive empathy (Ritter et al., 2011), others have found
the opposite pattern (Cain et al., 2015) or highlight the
remarkable heterogeneity present even within discrete diagnostic
groups (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014). Both clinical groups
reported significantly higher personal distress when empathizing,
however, indicating disruption to the process through which
we attribute the source of one’s own emotional state to
the target of our empathic expression. In light of the
aforementioned results, we suggest that such misattributions
stem from dysfunctional SOD arising from long-term elevations
of negative emotionality.
This leads us to our observation that both clinical groups
reported poorer self-regulation of their emotions – the MPD
group in highly demanding situations, and AD participants
following failure. When faced with challenging events, these
individuals tend to display stronger state orientation – a
regulatory mode characterized by indecision and hesitation
that prevents change to mental and behavioral states (Kuhl,
2000). Dispositions toward state orientation in these clinical
populations is unsurprising given the difficulties they exhibit in
down-regulating negative and up-regulating positive emotions;
poor regulatory control over one’s emotional reactions has long
been recognized as a reliable predictor of many psychiatric
(affective) illnesses, and emotional inflexibility predicts pathology
following stressful events (Coifman and Summers, 2019).
Moreover, the results of the present study align closely with
those of our previous investigation with an independent
large-scale sample, which revealed an inflexible personality
profile characterized by a strong tendency toward avoidant,
borderline and depressive personality styles, and state-oriented
regulation (Shaw et al., 2018). This propensity to remain
in a state-oriented regulatory mode has been associated
with poor self-access and discrimination between one’s own
and others’ thoughts, wishes, and expectations, especially
under highly demanding and stressful conditions (Koole
et al., 2006). Our own and others’ research support these
assumptions: state- relative to action-oriented individuals
reported weaker motivation and poorer ability to adopt the
perspective of others, together with higher personal distress
when empathizing (Shaw et al., 2018); and patients with
Avoidant PD show disturbances in the identification of their
own inner states (“monitoring”; Semerari et al., 2014; Moroni
et al., 2016). In this light, it would be very informative
to determine how such ability to recognize and label one’s
emotions, contributes to the socio-cognitive profile revealed here.
Unfortunately, our test battery did not include any measure
focusing on self-awareness, and so this question remains open
for the time being.
In summary, this study has revealed that patients with
MPD exhibit a profile of disturbances to emotion recognition,
interference resolution and perspective taking, together with
heightened distress when empathizing with others and a
disposition toward state-oriented emotional regulation. We
have interpreted this profile as an indication of compromised
cognitive control, resulting in poor performance on measures
of social cognition that require the monitoring, updating and
shifting among cognitive representations, and inhibition of
inappropriate responses. Indeed, there is growing awareness
of the role played by these executive functions in social
cognition (Binney and Ramsey, 2019; Darda et al., 2019). Such
dysfunction in cognitive flexibility would also contribute to
the maladaptive disposition toward state-oriented emotional
regulation exhibited by the MPD group. This combination of
cognitive inflexibility and a stronger tendency toward state
orientation could lead to both the attributional biases and
inefficient self-other distinction demonstrated by these patients,
which together could underlie the dysfunctional interaction
styles characteristic of PD, especially in negatively valenced and
challenging situations.
It is important to acknowledge several potentials limitations
with this study that should be addressed in future research.
First, the modest size of our patient groups will have suppressed
the statistic power of this experiment. Moreover, since the
population of patients with MPD is characterized by considerable
heterogeneity, it is unclear whether our results generalize to other
samples. Consequently, although our findings of socio-cognitive
disturbances in MPD converge with research into other PD
samples, our interpretations should be treated with caution until
these preliminary results are replicated in much larger samples.
Second, given the length of our test battery for social cognition,
we chose not to extend it further with additional measures of
general executive abilities. Evidence suggests that socio-cognitive
capacities are related to more general executive functions,
however (Qureshi and Monk, 2018), and that PD is associated
with executive dysfunction (Coolidge et al., 2004). Future
research is needed to investigate how executive dysfunction
might be associated with, or even drive the impairments to
social cognition that we have observed in the present study.
Finally, existing evidence indicates the importance of symptom
severity in understanding socio-cognitive disturbances in this
patient population (Semerari et al., 2014, 2015; Moroni et al.,
2016), but global psychopathology was not measured in the
present study protocol. It is unknown, therefore, whether any
of the disturbances to social cognition we have revealed are
associated with indices of symptom severity, such as global
severity index. Future research should build on our findings to
address this.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides a
strong basis for subsequent research into social cognition
in a patient population that is largely overlooked yet
prevalent in clinical practice. By investigating multiple
components of social cognition rather than single
socio-cognitive ability, and using performance-based
measures of both elementary and higher-level socio-
cognitive abilities, future research that employs similar
test battery might identify the social cognitive deficits
that drive the atypical interpersonal behavior of MPD.
Performance-based measures are likely to capture different
aspects of socio-cognitive abilities to which self-report
instruments are insensitive (i.e., their rapid moment-by-
moment execution during real-world reciprocal social
interactions). Our study also demonstrates that the
assessment of social cognition does not have to be time
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consuming – similar test batteries could be administered
to screen for socio-cognitive abilities in clinical practice
to complement information collected via questionnaires
on metacognition.
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